Deterrence vs. Efficiency To Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution by Mourad Ali & Patrick Rio
 
« Deterrence vs. Efficiency To 
Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution » 
  
   M o u r a d   A L I  
    P a t r i c k   R I O  
    
 
DR n°2009-22 
   
 
« Deterrence vs. Efficiency To 
Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution » 
  
   M o u r a d   A L I  
    P a t r i c k   R I O  
    
 
DR n°2009-22 
   Deterrence vs. Efﬁciency To Regulate
Nonpoint Source Pollution
Mourad Ali∗ Patrick Rio†
Abstract
In the context of nonpoint source pollution the regulator can not
attribute individually the responsibility of pollution because of infor-
mational asymmetry which makes the costsof monitoring ofindivid-
ual emission very high. This grounds a moral hazard problem. We
analyse group performance based instruments to regulate this kind
ofinformational problem. Inparticular, weassessrandomandcollec-
tive ﬁning schemeswithrespecttotheirdeterrenceand efﬁciency. We
show that a collective ﬁne scheme is more deterrent than a random
ﬁne scheme. However, the analysis of efﬁciency is less categorical
between these two schemes. The efﬁciency depends on the number
of non-compliant agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is
high it is better to implement a collective ﬁne scheme. If the number
of non-compliant agents is small it is better to implement a random
ﬁne scheme.
Keywords : Nonpoint Source Pollution, Group Performance Based In-
struments, Deterrence, Efﬁciency.
JEL codes : H2, H3, L5, Q5
∗University of Montpellier 1. Address: INRA LAMETA, 2 Place Pierre VIALA, 34060
Montpellier Cedex 2, France. Email: ali@supagro.inra.fr.
†INRA. Address: INRA LAMETA, 2 Place Pierre VIALA, 34060 Montpellier Cedex 2,
France. Email: rio@supagro.inra.fr.
11 Introduction
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution which appears in the form of sur-
face pollution (rivers, lakes) aswell as underground pollution (watertable)
is characterized by the fact that the regulator cannot observe individual
emissions because it is very costly and/or technically impossible to un-
dertake. This prevents the regulator from using usual instruments such
as taxes, standards and tradable permits markets to regulate this kind of
pollution. This is why other types of instruments have been designed that
circumvent issues associated to the control and monitoring of individual
emissions. Indeed, the literature addressed the use of observable vari-
ables such as inputs and outputs ([5] and [16]) but also the ambient pol-
lution ([10] and [14]) measured at a well deﬁned hotspot. In this article
we address economic instruments based on collective performance which
is the level of ambient pollution. Instead of seeking to manage individual
emissions (individual performance) the regulator controls aggregated pol-
lution (collective performance) at a hotspot, having deﬁned beforehand an
ambient standard not to be exceeded.
Collective performance basedinstruments have beendesignedtosolve the
team moral hazard issue [7], [4] and [13] and have then been extended to
nonpoint source pollution issues. The ﬁrst authors which have mobilized
collective performance based instruments to manage nonpoint source pol-
lution are Meran and Schwalbe [10] and Segerson [14]. These authors have
independently proposed an incentive tax/subsidy scheme based on the
difference between an ambient pollution level observed and a predeter-
mined ambient pollution target. The originality of the scheme is that it
applies in both cases of an excess or a lack of pollution compared to the
target.
One of the main criticism raised against these schemes is that they are
not budget balancing [4], [13], [6]. Indeed, when the number of agents
2subject to the scheme is high, the amount of collected tax (or subsidy)1 is
very high compared to the social costs of environmental damage. Indeed,
the schemes proposed by Meran and Schwalbe [10] and Segerson [14] im-
ply either an excess of collected tax compared to the social damage, or an
excess of granted subsidies compared to the social beneﬁt. Hence the non-
budget balancing issue.
In order to overcome this problem, Xepapadeas [18] proposed two mech-
anisms. The ﬁrst one is based on a collective tax/subsidy and the second
one is based on random tax to solve both monitoring and control issues
and the problem of budget-balance. The collective tax/subsidy scheme
proposed by Xepapadeas [18] is based on the fact that if the ambient pol-
lution standard is exceeded, each agent is taxed but also receives a subsidy
for each abatementunit. Therandom taxisbased on the fact that ifthe pol-
lution standard is exceeded, an agent will be randomly chosen and taxed,
independently from his responsibility for the ambient pollution excess.
Then the tax is redistributed among the other agents. Although Holm-
str¨ om [7] demonstrated that there is no budget-balanced mechanism that
induces the agents to implement the efﬁcient abatement, Xepapadeas [18],
by allowing the redistribution of the tax/subsidy, shows that this mecha-
nism is budget-balanced.
Numerousauthors haveanalysedcollective tax/subsidy schemesandran-
dom taxes to manage nonpoint source pollution ([3] ; [2] ; [8] ; [17]). How-
ever these papers were targeted at assessing the economic efﬁciency of
these instruments. Alpizar et al. [1] follow these authors by assessing the
efﬁciency of random versus collective ﬁning schemes to achieve an ambi-
ent pollution target in a laboratory framework.
However, this literature does not treat the problem of punishing the com-
pliant agents among the non-compliant and its impact on deterrence and
1According to the differencebetween the ambient pollution standard and the ambient
pollution level observed.
3efﬁciency. Indeed, the main characteristic of random mechanisms is that at
least one agent will be randomly ﬁned ifthe ambientstandard isexceeded.
However, the regulator is not sure to ﬁne the agent who has contributed
to the excess of pollution according to the standard. This raises the issue
of punishing the compliant agents.
In the case of a collective scheme, all the agents will be ﬁned if the ambient
standard is exceeded. So the regulator knows for sure that free-riders will
be ﬁned. However, even the agents who have provided an abatement ef-
fort will be ﬁned, raising also the issue of punishing the compliant agents.
This in turn raises the issue of the social efﬁciency of such schemes that do
not discriminate the compliant from the non-compliant agents.
In this article we analyse random and collective schemes from the deter-
rence point of view, i.e., we are interested in the capacity that a mechanism
has to compel the agents to conform to a given policy. Then we anal-
yse these two schemes from the point of view of efﬁciency in the vein of
Miceli and Segerson [11]. We extend their analysis to the case of several
non-compliant agents and ﬁne randomly applied to more than one agent.
We show that a collective ﬁne scheme is more deterrent than a random ﬁne
scheme. However, the analysis of efﬁciency is less categorical between
collective and random ﬁne schemes. It depends on the number of non-
compliant agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is high it is bet-
ter to implement a collective ﬁne scheme. If the number of non-compliant
agents is small it is better to implement a random ﬁne scheme.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we assess the deterrence
of both random and collective schemes. Then in section 3 the efﬁciency
analysis is performed for these two schemes. Section 4 discusses and con-
cludes.
42 Random vs. Collective Fining Schemes: A De-
terrence Analysis
Consider an agent i among n heterogeneous agents, identiﬁed on a well
deﬁned zone. Each agent is characterized by an individual abatement
level ai and an abatement cost function, increasing and convex, ci(ai). The
proﬁt function of agent i is then:
πi = π
0
i − ci(ai) (1)
where π0
i is agent i’s proﬁt before the pollution abatement policy is ap-
plied. We assume that the abatement level does not affect the output func-
tion [14].
The regulator does not know individual abatement levels ai but she can






0 − Z (2)
Z0 being the ambient pollution level before the implementation of the
abatement policy, and Z the observed ambient pollution level.
The regulator imposes an ambient pollution standard ¯ Z she wants to pre-
vent the agents from exceeding collectively. The aggregated abatement
objective A∗ is determined by the difference between the pre-policy aggre-
gated pollution level and the ambient standard:
A
∗ = Z
0 − ¯ Z (3)
















∗ with k 6= i (6)
However as the agent can only control ai, this program can not be solved
without added information or some coordination of the agents.
Agent i’s choices are restricted by the others’ decisions as described in the
equation 6. This constraint is said coupling [9] because it links the pro-
grams of all agents.
Let a∗
i be the abatement level that solves the equation 4 subject to the cou-
pling constraint 5 in a socially optimal way. The optimal equilibrium in
A∗ = (a∗
1,...,a∗
n) is such that c
0
1(a∗
1) = ... = c
0
n(a∗
n). To reach this equilibrium,
it is necessary that each agent, including i, knows the others’ marginal
abatement costs, or, when this condition is not met, that there is an ex-
change of information that guides the agents towards this equilibrium.
Theliterature oncollective performance basedinstrumentstomanagenon-
point source pollution avoids this point by assuming that the agents are
homogeneous ([18] and [1]) or by assuming that the agents cooperate, be-
cause they have an interest to do so, to determine a∗
i [12], or that the cost
function is common knowledge [14]. In the case of nonpoint source pol-
lution, these conditions seem quite demanding. We maintain the assump-
tion that a∗
i is not observable. Then it only matters that the abatement




∗. Therefore, there exists a
6lot of vectors ˜ A = (˜ a1,...,˜ an) such that
n X
j=1
˜ aj > A
∗,j = [1,...,n].
In the case where neither the regulator nor the agents know the (other)
agents’ marginal cost functions, the regulator cannot implement an efﬁ-
cient policy that ensures that all the agents responsible for pollution con-
form to the abatement target. Failing to implement such a policy, and in
charge of ensuring depolluting activities, the regulator needs to develop
deterrent mechanisms. The only information exchanged between the reg-
ulator andthe agentsisaﬁne appliedifthepollution standard isexceeded.
More precisely, in what follows we analyse two schemes that enforce to
reach the collective abatement objective through deterrence.
2.1 Random Fine
Here we consider that the agents have to produce a collective abatement





ment level is not met, m agents among the n agents concerned by the pol-




have to pay a ﬁne fr whatever their individual abatement. The individual
proﬁt function becomes:
• if the collective abatement A is below A∗ such that ambient pollution














• if the collective abatement A is above or equal to A∗:
πi(ai) = π
0
i − ci(ai) (8)


















probability for agent i to be randomly chosen to be ﬁned.
Equation (9) can be compactly read:
Eπi = π
0




For a risk-neutral agent, compliance to the optimal abatement level is a
dominant strategy if:








fr > ci(˜ ai) − ci(ai) ∀ai ∈ Ai (12)
with, Ai the abatement decision space of the agent i.
Agent i compares the gain from abating less than what is required by the





To ensure that inequality (12) holds, the regulator can act on two variables
: the level of the random ﬁne fr and the number of agents to ﬁne. Indeed,
by increasing any of these variables, the regulator ensures a higher level
of compliance, thus a high level of deterrence.
However, in contrast with Xepapadeas’ scheme [18], any polluting unit
reduced above the standard ¯ Z does not guarantee that a subsidy will be
granted. Hence, an agent can not know his socially optimal abatement
level, thus agent i faces a dilemma:
8- if his individual abatement level ai is above ˜ ai he incurs an additional
cost ci(ai) − ci(˜ ai) and faces a random ﬁne with a probability
m
n
if A < A∗.
- if his individual abatement level ai is below ˜ ai he saves an abatement cost
ci(˜ ai) − ci(ai) and also faces a random ﬁne with a probability
m
n
if A < A∗.
However, the higher the individual abatement level ai, the lower the prob-
ability that the ambient standard is exceeded pr. On the other hand, the
lower the individual abatement level ai, the higher pr.
2.2 Collective Fine
Underthe collective ﬁne scheme, agents are collectively ﬁned ifthe regula-
tor observes that the aggregated abatement objective is not reached. Then
she imposes a ﬁne fc to each agent. The difference with the random ﬁne
scheme is that potential polluters are sure to be ﬁned if the abatement ob-
jective is not reached. If it is, no one will be ﬁned. Hence the following
proﬁt function:
• if the collective abatement A is below A∗ such that ambient pollution
standard ¯ Z is exceeded:
πi(ai) = π
0
i − ci(ai) − fc (13)
• if the collective abatement A is above or equal to A∗:
πi(ai) = π
0
i − ci(ai) (14)
In terms of expected proﬁt:
Eπi = pc(π
0
i − ci(ai) − fc) + (1 − pc)(π
0
i − ci(ai)) (15)
9With pc the probability, in the collective ﬁne case, that A < A∗.
Equation (15) leads to:
Eπi = π
0
i − ci(ai) − pcfc (16)
For a risk-neutral agent, compliance with the optimal abatement level is
an equilibrium if:
ci(˜ ai) < ci(ai) + pcfc (17)
which implies :
pcfc > ci(˜ ai) − ci(ai) ∀ai ∈ Ai (18)
with, Ai the abatement decision space of the agent i.
Agent i compares the gain from abating less than what is required by the
ambient standard, li = ci(˜ ai) − ci(ai), with the expected cost from being
ﬁned pcfc.
In order to guarantee that inequality (18) holds, the regulator can impact
on the collective ﬁne level fc, depending on the level of deterrence she will
choose.
Contrary to the random ﬁne case, if agent i modiﬁes his individual abate-
ment level below ˜ ai he faces a collective ﬁne fc with certainty. However,
his individual abatement level has an impact on the probability that the
pollution standard is exceeded pc.
2.3 Discussion On Deterrence
The above-analysis addressed the deterrence capacity of random and col-
lective ﬁne schemes. We have shown that in order for the random ﬁne




fr > ci(˜ ai) − ci(ai) ; and for the collective ﬁne to do so: pcfc > ci(˜ ai) −
ci(ai). However, in both cases, the ﬁne does not depend on the agents’ ac-
tions while the agents’ actions depend on the ﬁne: ai(f).

























Let Pir be the probability for agent i to be ﬁned under a random ﬁne




The costs incurred by agent i when a collective ﬁne is applied are:
ci(ai(fc)) + pcfc (22)













Let Pic be the probability for agent i to be ﬁned under a collective ﬁne
scheme. Then Pic = pc.






consequently Pir = Pic, then pr
m
n
= pc which leads to pc < pr.
Facing the same risk of being ﬁned at a given ﬁne amount, the agents
assess higherprobability to exceed the standard underthe random scheme
pr. As it has been deﬁned above, a highly deterrent mechanism leads the
probability to exceed the standard toward zero. Then we can conclude
from that the collective ﬁne is more deterrent than the random ﬁne.
3 Randomvs. CollectiveFiningSchemes: AnEf-
ﬁciency Analysis
We analysed above the random and collective ﬁne from the point of view
of deterrence. In this section we analyse these two types of ﬁne from the
point of view of efﬁciency in the vein of Miceli and Segerson [11] who
consider the case of only one non-compliant agent. However, as in the
case of nonpoint source pollution, the number of non-compliant agents is
unknown, we assume that is equal to m, with m ∈ [1,n].
The rationale Micelli and Segerson (2007) are using consists to assess the
behavior ofthepivotal agent. However, itseemsreleventtoadjust thecon-
trol policy to some expectation the regulator has about the number of non-
compliant agents. This number up to some extend depends on the instru-
ment she implements. So, we extend the analysis of Miceli and Segerson
[11] to m agents which are both non-compliant and non-identiﬁed. There-
fore we are able to study the impact of m on the efﬁciency of both schemes.
In this section we measure the efﬁciency through the comparison between
the Social Welfare of both random and collective schemes. The Social Wel-
fare is given by the difference between the social beneﬁt and the social cost
of the applied scheme and whose Social Welfare is above the other is the
most efﬁcient.
A social beneﬁt appears when an incentive is applied to the proper agent.
In our case, this corresponds to a ﬁne applied to an agent who does not
12enough reduce its emissions. A social cost appears when an incentive is
applied to the wrong agent. In our case, this corresponds to a ﬁne applied
to an agent who does enough reduce its emissions.
Let B(f) be the social beneﬁt function to implement a ﬁne f to the non-
compliant agents, and f∗ the ﬁne that maximizes this function B(f). The
characteristics of this social beneﬁt function are such that: If f < f∗ then
∂B
∂f







∂f2 < 0 and B(0) = 0.
Let ˆ m the number of non-compliant agents. We assume that the regulator
makes an assumption about ˆ mand chooses m such that the number of ran-
domly ﬁned agents equals the number of non-compliant agents. We also
note r the probability to ﬁne an agent among the n agents. As the number
of agents randomly ﬁned is m then r =
m
n
. Thus, r = 1 means that all
agents are ﬁned, this is the case of collective ﬁne, such that m = n.
AlongthelinesofMiceliandSegerson [11], wecomparetheﬁningschemes
with respect to the ex post Social Welfare they induce.
The Social Welfare under random ﬁne is:
SWr = rmB(fr) − r(n − m)γfr (25)
The social welfare SWr under random ﬁne is equal to the social beneﬁt
B(fr) to ﬁne the m non-compliant agents with probability r minus the cost
γfr to ﬁne the (n − m) compliant agents with probability r.
m (n − m)
r non-compliant agents ﬁned compliant agents ﬁned
rmB(fr) r(n − m)γfr
(1 − r) non-compliant agents not ﬁned compliant agents not ﬁned
0 0
As shown in the table above, the social beneﬁt of imposing a ﬁne on the m
13non-compliant agents is zero, and the social cost of not imposing a ﬁne on
the (n − m) compliant agents is also zero.
The social welfare under collective ﬁne is achieved from the random ﬁne
expression (??) when r is set to 1:
SWc = ˆ mB(fc) − (n − ˆ m)γfc (26)
In the collective ﬁne scheme the assumption ˆ m = m is not needed and
at every time non-compliant agents will be ﬁned. Thus the social welfare
SWc under collective ﬁne is equal to the social beneﬁt B(fc) to ﬁne the ˆ m
non-compliant agents with probability r = 1, because it is sure that they
will be ﬁned, minus the costs γfr to ﬁne the (n− ˆ m) compliant agents with
probability r = 1, because it is sure that they will also be ﬁned.




, and the amount of fr. So, the regulator seeks to maximize the







− r(n − m)γ = 0 (27)
dSWr
dr







γ , with m 6= 0 (29)
As m < n, so
dB
dfr
> 0. This implies that fr < f∗ and B(fr) < B(f∗).
However the regulator can act on m such that
dB
dfr
becomes close to zero.
In this case the regulator chooses m > ˆ m, i.e., the number of ﬁned agents
is higher than the number of non-compliant agents. Such a change has
14a negative impact on social welfare SWr and increase the social costs be-
cause the number of compliant agents ﬁned will increase.
In the random ﬁne scheme the higher SWr is obtained if all non-compliant
agents ˆ m are choose randomly. In this case the social cost is equal to zero
and the social welfare is at the maximum.
In the collective scheme the regulator can act only on fc. So, the regulator












(n − ˆ m)
ˆ m
γ , with ˆ m 6= 0 (31)
As ˆ m < n, B is increasing with fc, and following the deﬁnition of B, then
f∗
c < f∗. However, the social welfare SWc, is negative when
ˆ m
n − ˆ m
B(fc) <
γfc, a situation which can happen where ˆ m is small compared to (n − ˆ m)
and/or B(fc) is small compared to γfc.
In the collective ﬁne scheme the higher ˆ m the higher SWc is. As we are
in nonpoint source pollution framework the rugulator does not know ˆ m.
For this reason, some money has to be diverted to make more accurate the
selection of the non-compliant agents. If ˆ m is close to n the regulator has to
choose the collective ﬁne scheme to obtain the higher social welfare SWc.
If ˆ m is small compared to n the regulator has to choose the random ﬁne
scheme to obtain the higher social welfare SWr.
154 Conclusion
In this article we analysed the collective and random ﬁnes from the point
of view of deterrence and efﬁciency. In the ﬁrst step, we show that the
collective ﬁne scheme is more dissuasive than the random ﬁne scheme.
However, the analysis of efﬁciency is less categorical between collective
and random ﬁne schemes. It depends on the number of non-compliant
agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is high it is better to imple-
ment a collective ﬁne scheme. If the number of non-compliant agents is
small it is better to implement a random ﬁne scheme.
However, economic policies whose goal is deterrence and those whose
goal isefﬁciency, donotapplytothesamecircumstances. Indeed,deterrence-
based instruments are applied in the case where the regulator can not
achieve the efﬁciency, because of the informational asymmetry between
her and the agents covered by the instrument, and the non-cooperation
between these agents. The efﬁciency-based instruments, are applied when
the regulator is to accompany her economic policy with a mechanism of
identiﬁcation of non-compliant agents.
So, these two goal-based instruments are substitutable and applicable in
different situations. However, it is possible that both could be used com-
plementarily. In this case deterrence is seen as a threat, that the regulator
can put forward, if the goal of efﬁciency is not reached [15].
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